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vs.
UNCLE BARTS, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, BOARD OF REVIEW
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
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Case Nos. 90000716
90000342
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND

PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

All statutory citations are to Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended.
JURISDICTION
Sections 78-2a-3(2)(a) and 35-1-86

grant the court

jurisdiction of this appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue:

Did Jacqui Walls' injury to her foot arise out

of the course of her employment with Uncle Bart's?
Standard of review:
entitled to deference.

The commission's decision is

An agency is entitled to deference
1

where the governing statute explicitly or implicitly conMorton

tains a grant of discretion.
State

Tax Commission,

International,

814 P.2d 581 (Utah, 1991).

Inc.

vs.

The Work-

ers 7 Compensation Act grants broad discretion to the Industrial Commission, as follows:
35-1-16(1) "It shall be the duty of the commission, and it shall have full power, jurisdiction,
and authority to:
(a) supervise every employment and place
of employment and to administer and
enforce all laws for the protection of
the life, health, safety, and welfare of
employees;"
35-1-20. "All orders of the commission within its
jurisdiction shall be presumed reasonable and
lawful until they are found otherwise in an action
brought for that purpose, or until altered or
revoked by the commission."
35-1-33. "A substantial compliance with the requirements of this title shall be sufficient to
give effect to the orders of the commission, and
they shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or
void for any omission of a technical nature."
These statutes clearly grant the Industrial Commission
broad authority and discretion to interpret, construe,
consider and determine the matters before it under the
Worker7s Compensation Act.

Accordingly, the Commission7s

order in this matter is entitled to deference.
Further, the Commission7s finding that Ms. Walls was
not acting in the course of her employment at the time of
her accident is a factual determination and must be affirmed
if there is substantial evidence in light of the record as a
2

whole.

Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) and Grace Drilling

of Review,

vs.

Board

776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

35-1-45. "Each employee mentioned in Section 351-43 who is injured and the dependents of each
such employee who is killed, by accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not
purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury
or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and
hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the
employee."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the Industrial
Commission denying the applicant compensation and benefits
under the Workers7 Compensation Act for an injury she sustained on December 29, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These are the relevant facts found by the Commission7s
administrative law judge:
The applicant, Jacqui Walls, worked as a bartender at
Uncle Bart's, a bar in Ogden, Utah.

R-36. Ms. Walls worked

the day shift at Uncle Bart's from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
R-36.
On December 29, 1989, after the end of her shift, Ms.
3

Walls' figuratively removed her bartender hat and donned the
hat of a customer of Uncle Bart's.

She remained at the bar

drinking beer, shooting pool and socializing.
performed no work related activities.

R-37.

She

R-37.

Ms. Walls' theory at the hearing was that she had been
asked to remain and help train one Ryan Thomas, a new employee.

R-37.

The administrative law judge found that

assertion was not worthy of belief in light of his observation of the applicant's testimony and the testimony of
Thomas, who stated that he knew the things that Ms. Walls
alleged she was to teach him, principally the operation of
the cash register, and that he was supervised by one Toby
Racine, the night manager.

R-37, 38.

Both Thomas and Racine were "large individuals", Thomas
standing in excess of six feet tall and weighing at least
215 pounds.

R 37-38.

Ms. Walls, at 5'2" tall and weighing

102 pounds, is best described as slight.

R-37.

Ms. Walls'

description of the accident and her motive for the action
she supposedly was engaged in will show the relevance of
this size difference.
Sometime between 10:30 to 11:00 p.m., some five and
one-half to six hours after her shift ended, Ms. Walls
alleges that she took it upon herself to make a 13 0 pound
keg of beer ready for tapping, although no one had instructed her to do so.

R-37.

As she opened the door of the
4

cooler where Uncle Bart's stored its chilled beer, a keg
fell on Ms. Walls' foot causing the injury for which she now
seeks compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act.
37.

R-

It beggars the imagination that a person of Jacqui

Walls' physical stature was in fact attempting to help her
employer by moving a keg of beer weighing more than she did,
when both the bartender and assistant manager were present
and more than up to the task.
The administrative law judge found that Ms. Walls was
not in the course of her employment at the time of her
injury. R-38.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should affirm the decision of the Industrial
Commission because Ms. Walls' injury occurred long after her
duty hours and while she was a patron, not an employee', of
Uncle Bart's.
ARGUMENT
MS. WALLS FAILED TO PROVE THAT HER INJURY AROSE
OUT OF THE COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that it was Ms.
Walls' burden at the hearing to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that she sustained her injury in the course of
her employment.

Higley

vs. Industrial

Commission,

75 Utah

361, 285 P. 306 (1930).
Section 35-1-45 provides that injuries are only compen5

sable if they arise "out of and in the course of employment."

Under Utah law, that phrase contains two separate

conditions.

The Commission's administrative law judge found

that Ms. Walls did not meet the second condition which is
that the injury must arise in the course of her employment.
An injury only occurs "in the course of employment" if
"it occurs while the employee is rendering service to his
employer which he was hired to do or doing something incidental thereto, at the

time

when and the place where he was

authorized to render such service."
trial

Commission,

(emphasis added.)

M & K Corp* vs.

Indus-

112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (1948).
Reduced to its essence, the injury must

occur while the employee is within her employment relationship, as defined by the agreement between the parties.
Obviously, one of the terms of that agreement is the employee's work schedule.

Ms. Walls' injury occurred long after

her quitting time, while she was at best a patron of Uncle
Bart's and while she was outside of her employment relationship.
Whether an accident occurs before work starts or after
it is over is an element which determines if an injury
occurs within the course of employment.

Generally, an em-

ployee who sustains an injury within a reasonable time
before or after his or her shift is entitled to worker's
compensation benefits.

1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
6

COMPENSATION § 21.60(c)-

However, if an employee merely

loiters after hours, she may be found to be outside the
course of her employment.

Ibid.

similar to this one, Lona vs.

In a case remarkably

Sosa,

420 N.E. 2d 890 (Ind.

App. 1981), the court found that a bartender was not within
the course of employment at the time of his death when he
stayed in the bar drinking for 2 1/2 hours after his shift
ended, and was shot and killed by the assistant manager,
apparently over a dispute involving a shortage in the till.
When Jacqui Walls/ shift ended and she remained in the
bar, her relationship to Uncle Bart's fundamentally changed*
She became a customer.

When that occurred, Uncle Bart's was

no longer strictly liable under the Workers' Compensation
Act for virtually any misfortune that may have befallen
Jacqui Walls. As a patron, Uncle Bart's owed Ms. Walls
those duties which a business owes to its customers, and
subject to all of the rights and liabilities inherent in
that

relationship.
On appeal, Ms. Walls, applying Black

Layton,

McDonald's

of

733 P.2d 154 (Utah, 1987), claims that she was in
Black

the course of her employment.
K Corp.

vs.

vs.

Industrial

Commission,

is consistent with M &
supra.

They both re-

quire, as a condition to employer liability under the Workers' Compensation Act, that the employee be working during
the period of her employment and doing work which her em7

ployer required her to perform.

At the time of Ms. Walls'

accident, Ryan Thomas, not the applicant, was the bartender
at Uncle Bart's.

Her responsibility to replenish the beer

supply ended at the same time her shift ended, five
half

hours

before her accident.

and

one-

Uncle Bart's neither ex-

tended her work hours nor called her back to duty to replenish the bar.
CONCLUSION
Jacqui Walls failed to prove that she was in the course
of her employment when she slipped off a barstool in Uncle
Bart's and took it upon herself to ready a new keg of beer
for consumption.

Substantial evidence shows that at that

time her relationship with Uncle Bart's was as a customer,
not as an employee.

Under Utah law she was not entitled to

receive benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, and
the Utah Court of Appeals should affirm the order of the
Industrial Commission.

^^

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / P

day of November, 1992.

c
Thomas C. Sturdy
Attorney for the Uniri&uf-ed
Employers' Fund
Defendant/Respondent

8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the Brief of the Uninsured Employers' Fund, on November
1992, to each of the following:
Robert Breeze
211 East Broadway #215
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Benjamin A. Sims
General Counsel
The Industrial Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 146600
160 East 3 00 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600

[/

t

APPENDIX "A"

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

B90000716 & 90000342

JACQUI C. WALLS,
Applicant,
VS.

UNCLE BARTS, (UNINSURED);
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
November 20, 1990, at 10:00 o'clock a.m; same
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Applicant was present and represented by Robert
Breeze, Attorney at Law.
The defendant, Uncle Barts, was represented by M.
David Eckersley, Attorney at Law.
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by
Bruce Wilson, Legal Counsel.

FURTHER HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
March 23, 1992, at 8:30 o'clock a.m; same
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.
Applicant did not appear but was represented by
Robert Breeze, Attorney at Law.
Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by
Cynthia Anderson, Associate Legal Counsel.

JACQUI C. WALLS
ORDER
PAGE TWO
Subsequent to the first hearing in this matter, the
Administrative Law Judge was informed by Mr. Eckersley/ counsel for
the defendant and the estate of Bart Dunsdon, that the estate was
insolvent, and, accordingly, the estate was dismissed as a party
defendant. That left the Uninsured Employers Fund as the remaining
party defendant in this matter. At the conclusion of the first
evidentiary hearing in this matter, unrecorded telephonic testimony
was taken from a co-employee of the applicant, Ryan Thomas.
Pursuant to the objection of the applicant's counsel after the
testimony had been taken, further proceedings were scheduled for
the purpose of taking Mr. Thomas's testimony under oath. Those
subsequent proceedings were had on March 23, 1992.
It is
interesting to note that the applicant did not appear at the
further proceedings scheduled in this matter, and, as such, did not
rebut the testimony of Mr. Thomas in this matter.
Being fully
advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared
to enter the following

FINDINGS OF FACT:
At the outset, I should indicate that this case involves a
serious credibility issue.
This is especially so, since the
original defendant in this matter, Bart Dunsdon, owner of Uncle
Barts, passed away and, as such, is unable to either corroborate or
dispute the applicant's testimony, concerning conversations and/or
instructions she received from the decedent. Accordingly, for this
reason, the credibility of the applicant is of critical importance
as is the credibility of the only other testifying witness, Mr.
Thomas. Having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both
the applicant and the witness, I conclude that the applicant's
credibility
is wanting in this matter.
Because of the
unavailability of Mr. Dunsdon, it is necessary to weigh the
applicant's testimony, taking into full account the extreme
likelihood that her testimony would be of a self-serving nature.
Weighing the obvious self-serving nature of the applicant's
testimony as against the testimony of Mr. Thomas, I find that Mr.
Thomas has no interest in this matter, and, as such, his testimony
is more credible. His testimony is especially more credible in
light of the remaining circumstantial evidence contained on the
file.
The applicant was employed by Uncle Barts as a bar tender, and
had started that employment in September of 1989. The applicant
was so employed on December 29, 1989, when she alleges that she
sustained a compensable industrial accident.
The applicant
testified that her shift started at 10:00 a.m., and would normally
end at 5:00 p.m.. Which shift consisted of the day shift. Mr.

JACQUI WALLS
ORDER
PAGE THREE
Ryan Thomas on December 29, 1989, was to work the evening shift,
which started at 6:00 p.m., and continued until closing, which was
at 1:00 a.m. .
The applicant testified that following the end of her shift,
she decided to hang around the bar and informed Mr. Dunsdon of that
fact. The applicant contends that Mr. Dunsdon instructed her to
help Mr. Thomas with the till. However, Mr. Thomas testified that
he did not require any instruction with the till, and that besides,
Mr. Toby Racine was the night manager and he was instructed to
train Mr. Thomas. Mr. Thomas testified that the applicant was
sitting on the other side of the bar, meaning that she was sitting
on the stool during his work shift. The applicant in her direct
testimony, admitted that she was engaged in social activities such
as playing pool and the applicant admitted that she had four beers
before her injury. Given the length of time the applicant was at
the bar, I find her testimony that she only had four beers strains
credulity.
The applicant went on to testify that at approximately 10:3011:00 p.m., the applicant became aware that a keg of beer was
empty. The applicant testified that she was going to get the keg
ready for Ryan to tap, and towards that end, she went to the back
room where cold kegs were kept in an old refrigerator. As she
opened the door, the keg slid out and crushed her left foot.
According to the applicant's theory of the injury, she was required
to be on the premises to help Mr. Thomas with the till, and also to
help him to get the keg ready for tapping.
However, the
applicant's theory of why she remained on the premises does not
bear scrutiny.
The applicant, herself, testified that after quitting time,
she remained at the bar for the purpose of socializing and playing
pool. Mr. Thomas testified that he already had been trained in the
operation of the cash register by Mr. Racine, and, further, he
testified that the applicant was performing no work related
activities whatsoever during his shift. Rather, as admitted by the
applicant, she was socializing and imbibing alcohol as a customer
of Uncle Barts and not as an employee. That the applicant would be
required to help Mr. Thomas with the keg, is also unbelievable,
considering the physical stature of the applicant. The applicant,
at the time of the injury, stood 5 fpot 2 inches tall and weighed
approximately 102 pounds.
The Administrative Law Judge takes
judicial notice of the fact that a full keg of Coors beer contains
15 and 1/2 gallons of beverage
and weighs approximately 130
pounds. The applicants testimony that she was somehow instructed
or gleaned some implied instruction from Mr. Dunsdon that she stay
five or six hours after work and help Mr. Thomas and Mr. Racine
with a keg of beer, is simply incredible. By contrast, Mr. Thomas
stands in excess of 6 feet tall, and weighed at least 215 pounds.

JACQUI WALLS
ORDER
PAGE FOUR
Although I did not have an opportunity to observe Mr- Racine,
the applicant testified on cross-examination, that bcth Mr, Racine
and Mr. Thomas were rather large individuals, which rings true,
since most taverns tend to prefer larger male individuals for
"bouncer" purposes. That the applicant would have been expected to
move a 13 0 pound full keg of beer at her weight of 102 pounds,
simply defies logic.
The more likely scenario, is that the applicant finished her
work at 5:00 p.m., and having nothing better to do that evening,
decided to remain at the bar after quitting time to play pool and
drink beer. The applicant was not on duty, because Uncle Barts had
two other employees on duty, namely, Ryan Thomas and Toby Racine.
Mr. Racine was the night manager, while Mr. Thomas was the bar
tender.
The applicant apparently on her own, decided that she
would ready the keg for Mr. Thomas, although she was instructed by
no one to do so. Therefore, at 10:30 or 11:00 p.m. on December 29,
1989, I find that the applicant was not in the course of her
employment, but rather, was on the premises of her employer as a
customer, and not as an employee.
I would also add that the
applicants predominate motive at that time was not a good faith
and intention to further her employer7s work, but rather, she was
there for personal entertainment reasons. Any "benefit" to the
employer was merely an incidental by-product. Therefore, I find
that the applicant's injury did not arise out of and in the course
of her employment on December 29, 1989.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The injury to the applicant of December 29, 1989, did not
arise out of and in the course of her employment with Uncle Barts
(Uninsured).

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the workers compensation claim of
Jacqui C. Walls, alleging a compensable industrial accident arising
out of and the in the course of her employment with Uncle Barts on
December 19, 1989, should be, and the same is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.

JACQUI WALLS
ORDER
PAGE FIVE

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.

Certified by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
?3AM

day of April, 1992.

the
the
and
not
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attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the
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Robert Breeze
Attorney at Law
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Administrator
Uninsured Employers Fund
Cynthia Anderson
Associate Legal Counsel
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Wilma Burrow
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APPENDIX "B"

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6 600
Jacqui C. Walls,

*

Applicant,
vs.

*
•'

*

DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR REVIEW

*
*

Uncle Barts (Uninsured),
Uninsured Employers' Fund,
Respondents.

*
*
*

Case No. B90000716 &
90000342

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant filed a Motion for Review on April 23, 1992 of
the administrative law judge's (ALJ) order of April 3, 1992. On
April 23, 1992, also, the applicant filed a Motion For Order
Extending Time In Which To File Motion For Review While Transcript
Is Prepared asking for an extension of time until 15 days after the
receipt of the transcript. On May 12, 1992, the applicant filed a
perfected Motion for Review alleging the following errors:
1. The ALJ's conclusion that the injuries sustained by
the applicant did not arise out of and in the course of employment;
2.
Dislike of the ALJ lor the applicant, and his
wrongfully attempting to cast the applicant in a disreputable
light;
3. The finding of the ALJ that the baiLend*?] >HI duty,
Ryan Thomas, needed no help; and,
4. The attempt by the ALJ to allow into evidence a
telephonic question and answer session with an individual who
purported to be Ryan Thomas.
The respondent, Bart Dunsdon, namesake of Uncle Barts, died
during the pendency of these proceedings, and as a result, his
estate was dismissed as a party defendant.
The Uninsured
Employers' Fund was left as the remaining respondent since Uncle
Barts was uninsured, and insolvent.
The applicant had been employed at the time of the injury as
a bar tender since September 1989. On the date of injury, December
29, 1989, the applicant remained after her normal day shift ended
at 5:00. She was replaced at that time by Mr. Ryan Thomas who was
to work from 6:00 p.m. unti] ]:00 a.m.

WALLS
ORDER
PAGE TWO
The applicant alleges that she informed Mr. Dunsauu of her
desire to hang around the bar, and that he instructed her to assist
Mr, Thomas with the till- However, Mr. Thomas testified that he
did not require any till instruction, and that Mr. Toby Racine,
night manager, was required to train Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Thomas testified that the applicant sat on the stool side
of the bar during his shift. The applicant admitted to engaging in
social activities such as playing pool, and had four beers before
her injury.
The applicant claimed to have become aware that around 10:3011:00 p.m., a keg of beer was empty, aiid that she went to the back
room to get the keg ready for Mr. Thomas to tap. As she opened the
refrigerator door where the cold kegs were kept, the keg slid out
and crushed her left foot. She testified that she was required by
Mr. Dunsdon to be on the premises to help Mr. Thomas with the till,
as well as to get kegs ready for tapping.
The ALJ determined that the applicant's version of why she
remained at the bar was incredible based on her testimony, and that
of Mr. Thomas. The ALJ concluded that the applicant probably had
nothing better to do that evening, and so she decided to remain at
the bar after her shift was finished to play pool and drink beer.
The applicant was determined by the ALJ to not be on duty since
there were two other employees on duty, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Racine.
The applicant decided that jfhe^jwould^pn h e r o w n ^ e a d y j ^
Mr. Thomas, and the ALJ found that in doing so ^e^was^not in the
teourse of her emplcjyiucnt;—she was a "customer for persona 1
'ehtertcpftment reasons, and not an employee during this episode;
and, Whatever benefit was derived by the employer was purely
Incidental. Therefore, the ALJ found that the applicant's injury
did not arise out of and in the course of her employment on
December 29, 1989.
An examination of the physical stature of the applicant
compared with the employees on duty on the evening in question is
helpful. The applicant is five feet two inches tall and weighs
approximately 102 pounds. A full keg of Coors beer contains 15 1/2
gallons of beer, and weighs approximately 130 pounds. Mr. Thomas
stands in excess of six feet tall, and weighs at least 215 pounds.
Although the ALJ did not observe Mr. Racine, the applicant
testified that both Mr. Thomas and Mr. Racine were rather large
individuals.
We agree that the facts of this case as found by the ZUJJ WUV,
saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and listened to their
testimony dictate a result contrary to the version espoused by the
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applicant. There is substantial evidence in the file to support
the findings of the ALJ.
With regard to the allegation that the ALJ's dislike for the
applicant, except for the applicant's assertion of the ALJ's
dislike for her, we find no evidence of bias, and the applicant has
shown us no evidence to support such claim. We therefore find this
assertion to bp without merit.
Next, the applicant alleges that the ALJ eried when lie
determined that Mr* Thomas needed no help, and that Mr. Thomas had
been trained. As evidence that he was untrained, the applicant
states that Mr. Thomas indicated that he had only been employed for
one week, that many prices were unmarked, and that he was not
familiar with all of the prices.
The ALJ had ample evidence to conclude that the applicant's
mission at the bar was not to assist Mr. Thomas with tapping a keg
of beer. There was testimony that there were two people on duty
during the period in question, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Racine, and
either of them appeared to have been capable of performing this
duty.
There is no evidence that Mr. Racine did not know the
prices, and there was testimony that Mr. Racine was in charge, and
could have assisted Mr. Thomas with price and other information.
When the physical size of the parties are considered, along with
the circumstances under which the applicant was at the bar, we
agree with the ALJ that her presence was social, and not as an
employee.
The last argument appears to be a makeweight issue which was
apparently eliminated as an issue when the ALJ had a hearing in
which Mr. Thomas testified. The applicant alleges that the ALJ "at
one point attempted to allow into evidence a telephonic question
and answer session with an individual who purported to be Ryan
Thomas.11 The applicant states that she continues to object. The
operative word here upon which this allegation of error must fail
is "attempted."
The claimant has neglected to show how she was
prejudiced by this attempted session.
Since the ALJ apparently
delayed the hearing until Mr. Thomas could testify under oath, and
could be cross examined, there could be no error. We note also,
that the applicant did not appear at the hearing, but that she was
represented by counsel.
For these reasons, we find the ALJ's findings of fact,
conclusions of lawr and order to be supported by substantial
evidence in light of the entire record, and that the allegations of
error by the applicant are without merit.
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ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated April 3, 1992 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party sha]i bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.
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